Introduction
This paper uses matching methods to evaluate the employment effects of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) . M&As are a key device to enlarge a purchasing firm in all developed countries. For instance, in Finland, hardly any significant restructuring of any industry has been carried out without ownership changes. The volume of cross-border M&As has increased at a rapid pace recently (Rossi and Volpin 2004) , inspiring a lot of debate in Europe. In general, the attitude towards M&As has been rather positive because they restructure the economy, but cross-border M&As have been seen, as a threat to employment, especially in public debate.
Systematic micro-level evidence on the causal effect of M&As on employment is quite sparse despite the importance of the topic. The literature has mostly studied the effects of foreign acquisitions on productivity and wages (e.g. Bellak 2004 ). This paper contributes by analysing the employment effects of M&As on target firms by using matched establishment-level data from Finland. In this paper, we do not focus solely on cross-border or domestic M&As; rather we analyse the employment effects of several different types of M&As. We classify M&As as being either a cross-border M&A (in which the purchaser is a foreign company that is located abroad), a domestic M&A with a domestically-owned purchaser, a domestic M&A with a foreign-owned company that is located in Finland, or an internal restructuring in which the purchaser is not another company.
The Finnish case has a broader interest. Since Finland is a small open country, the enlargement of foreign ownership can have a more profound effect on employment in Finland than in large countries. The issue has been a subject of public debate recently because cross-border M&As have greatly increased in number following the removal of restrictions over foreign ownership during the Page 3 of 35 A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 3 early 1990s. After establishing a Finnish affiliate, foreign firms have typically continued to enlarge through domestic M&As, especially in many service industries such as transport. This paper deviates from the earlier ones regarding the data coverage, the definition of M&As, and the methods. Earlier research was focused on manufacturing, but its share has declined in developed countries. Our data also include services. The dynamics of employment may be different in nonmanufacturing because services are less capital-intensive than manufacturing. It may well be that conclusions obtained earlier at least partly reflect their focus on the manufacturing sector.
Furthermore, our data register practically almost all M&As, not only major M&As.
We use information on the actual events of different types of M&As to establish our definitions. 1 The interference of foreign firms and foreign ownership is then more accurately specified than in the studies that consider a registered change from domestic to foreign majority ownership. Most of the earlier papers (e.g. Conyon et al. 2002a, Gugler and Yurtoglu 2004) have relied on parametric methods. We use non-parametric, matching methods instead. Our data enable us to ensure that the control group to whom the establishments, which have been targets of different types of M&As, are compared with include only those establishments that have not been involved in any kind of M&As.
This allows us to isolate the pure effects of different types of M&As.
In this paper, we discover that cross-border M&As lead to downsizing in manufacturing employment. The effects of cross-border M&As on employment in non-manufacturing are much weaker. Domestic M&As with a domestic purchaser, instead, have negative employment effects for all sectors. The impact of domestic M&As with foreign-owned purchasers is remarkably negative in construction and other services. In addition, internal restructurings have substantial negative A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 4 employment effects in trade (including hotels and restaurants). Taken together, our most important finding is that almost all changes in ownership lead to employment losses.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarises the empirical literature, Section 3 discusses the theoretical arguments, Section 4 contains a description of our data, Section 5 describes the empirical framework, and Section 6 reports our results and the last section concludes.
Relevant empirical literature
Brown and Medoff (1988), Bhagat et al. (1990) , and Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) The studies from Europe also report mixed findings. Conyon et al. (2001 Conyon et al. ( , 2002a Conyon et al. ( , 2002b ) discover the negative effects of M&As on employment in the UK by using data on 277 listed companies. The negative effects are particularly pronounced for hostile transactions. Girma and Görg (2004) find, by using data from the UK electronics industry, that the incidence of foreign takeover reduces employment growth, in particular for unskilled labour. Girma (2005) uncovers detrimental employment effects amongst larger foreign takeover targets in the UK, but beneficial impacts amongst smaller ones. Amess and Wright (2007) observe that management buyouts increase employment in the UK. Piscitello and Rabbiosi (2005) discover by using Italian firm-level data that, compared with firms that were not subject to any ownership change, companies targeted by foreign There are earlier studies on the effects of foreign acquisitions using Finnish data. All these papers have used data covering the manufacturing sector. They consider either productivity effects (Ilmakunnas and Maliranta 2004) or wage and education effects (Huttunen 2007) . In particular,
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Huttunen shows that the share of highly educated workers declines, although slightly and slowly, after the ownership has changed from domestic to foreign in the acquired plants. 1) obtain genuine synergy gains (Farrell and Shapiro 1990) ,
2) utilize scales economies in various forms, 3) strengthen the market power in pricing, 4) revise the implicit agreements related to the firm's personnel and other stakeholders, and 5) promote the managers' own deviating interests.
An M&A creates synergy gains when the more efficient practices are extended to comprise the whole enlarged firm. In horizontal M&As the marginal costs of production in an inefficient firm typically decrease to the level that prevails in the more efficient party. Vertical M&As may intensify incentives to exert effort (Lehto 2006) . Synergy-promoting M&As aim to increase productivity, perhaps also supporting employment. By raising efficiency, the parties of M&As become more competitive, which may help them to take over the market from their competitors.
It is not, however, evident that M&As, in general, tend only to internalize the benefits of genuine synergy gains. It is plausible that the parties of M&As often aim to use their assets jointly (including human capital) to obtain scale economies. Sharing assets is motivated by the cost M&As decrease the number of independent players, which concentrates the market. Salant et al. (1983) and Perry and Porter (1985) have shown that it does not pay to purchase another firm to decrease competition and to gain pricing power in the standard Cournot competition with constant returns to scale. When one introduces a non-linear cost function, the tendency to gain from the strengthened market power by higher prices will be part of horizontal M&As, and one can expect that M&As will reduce the scale of production and labour input, too. Shleifer and Summers (1988) have argued that the change in control associated with, especially, hostile M&As offers an opportunity for a new management team to renege on implicit and explicit labour contracts that constitute obstacles to layoffs. Implicit labour contracts are often used to encourage firm-specific investments (e.g. Malcomson 1997) . They are binding actions by the old owners and the old management team. The new management team that is put in place after an M&A is able to renege on implicit labour contracts and to reduce the amount of the workforce.
The idea that the managers engage in "empire building" has been regarded as one possible explanation for M&As (Schumpeter 1934 , Marris 1963 . The managers also deviate from the owner's interests when they use "free cash" to undertake other firms, as hypothesized by Jensen (1986) . These motives suggest a negative influence on the purchasing firm's profits, but regarding the impact on employment, the forecast is unclear. A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 8 i) the distance between the target and acquiring firm (domestic or foreign in our study),
ii) the nationality of the acquiring firm (domestic or foreign), and iii) the institutional nature of an acquirer (another firm or another form of M&A).
Research on the motives of M&As has suggested that information about the target firm may become more incomplete when the distance between the purchasing firm and the target firm increases (Lehto) . This explains why most purchasers are located close to targets. For instance, in the largest and in the most extensive M&As in Finland, the purchaser has always been domestic. A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 9 c) trade (including hotels and restaurants).
Manufacturing is largely global, from which it follows that foreign firms are as equally present in the relevant market as domestic firms. Owing to this, in manufacturing the opportunities to benefit from the restriction of competition can be considered scarce in all types of M&As. In the service industries a domestic purchaser, being located in the same relevant market as the target firm, may have a greater interest than a foreign purchaser to buy another firm to limit competition. This especially concerns services such as retail trade, but not banking, finance and insurance, which are no less global than manufacturing. Because the service market is sometimes geographically restricted and because the joint use of assets may encounter geographical limits (Lehto), we expect that in the service sectors rationalisation through asset sharing and the downsizing of employment is more typical of domestic M&As than of cross-border M&As. Accordingly, in the service industries and in construction, domestic M&As have a larger negative impact on employment than crossborder M&As. Such a difference is not expected in manufacturing.
Data
Our data on M&As originate from the magazine Talouselämä, which is published on a weekly basis. M&As are defined as being based on an ownership share of at least 50%. The magazine reports all M&As in which either the acquiring or the acquired firm is a Finnish one, or in which either the acquiring or the acquired firm is owned by a Finnish company. The magazine covers all sectors. The only restriction is that the magazine Talouselämä does not keep a record of M&As in which either the acquirer's or the target's turnover is less than FIM 3 million (or around 510 000
Euros). We exclude a small number of firms that have been targets of M&As two (or more) times within a single year to avoid conflating the effects of different types of M&As on employment. We
Page 10 of 35
A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 10 have linked firms that have been subjects of M&As to their establishments. Hence, the analysis is done at the establishment level because different establishments that belong to the same firm may perform differently. 5 In some cases only a certain establishment, not the whole firm, is purchased.
Different types of M&As that we analyse are cross-border M&As, domestic M&As with domestically-owned purchasers, domestic M&As with foreign-owned purchasers, and internal restructurings. Their exact definitions are given in Table 1 . "Domestic" refers to a firm that is domestically located. A domestically located firm can then be either domestically-owned or foreign-owned. Hence, "foreign" has a dual meaning: first, it refers to the distance between the acquirer and the target firm, and second, it specifies the nationality of an acquirer's owners from the target firm's viewpoint. We classify internal restructuring into its own category because restructuring without the presence of another firm lacks some potential for synergy gains. Group. There has been a substantial increase in the number of cross-border M&As during the latter part of the 1990s. Cross-border M&A activity has been most intensive in transport, the wholesale trade, and real estate, renting and business activities (Fig. 2 ). These particular sectors cover around 60% of all cross-border M&As. The difference in the incidence of cross-border M&As between manufacturing and services is interesting because earlier research has typically used data covering manufacturing.
Figures 1-2 around here
Matched data are assembled to obtain establishment-level variables that have a potential influence on the likelihood of being a target of an M&A and the evolution of employment after an incidence of M&A. (The variables are described in detail in Table 1 Statistics contains the plant code on the employee's employer in the last week of each year. As a result, it is possible to link Employment Statistics to other data sources maintained by SF.
Methodology
The features of M&As have implications for modelling. First, the selection of firms for targets is an important issue. Foreign companies tend to take over certain Finnish companies with particular observable characteristics. The results from Finnish data (Lehto) show that foreign companies tend to take over firms whose workers' education level is high, whose size is large, and who are exporters. Second, the adjustment of employment is not immediate, at least not in the manufacturing sector. Accordingly, we look at the effects of M&As on employment in time t + 1 and t + 2. The baseline for the employment level and for change in it is taken from t-1.
Propensity score matching aims to mimic a random experiment by constructing a control group from the group of untreated companies and ensuring that the control group is as similar as possible to the treatment group with respect to observable characteristics. 6 In our case the treatment is a situation in which a firm has been a target of a particular type of M&A. To construct a control group for firms that have been targets of M&As over the period 1989-2003, we have included all domestic firms from the Business Register by SF that have a turnover of at least FIM 3 million (or around 510 000 Euros). This is the very same limit that is used by the magazine Talouselämä when it reports M&As. Because we analyse the effects of M&As on employment in t+1 and t+2, we 
where t is year and s refers to industry level, in exact matching. Exact matching on years and industries ensures that the controls for the targets of different types of M&As are selected from the same year and from the same industry.
The main emphasis of our study is on the difference-in-differences estimates. We estimate the average treatment effects on the treated for employment changes following Blundell et al. (2004) by using the formula
where t 0 is a time point before the M&A and t 1 is a time point after the M&A. Difference-indifferences matching removes the fixed firm effects. The validity of the estimator rests on common time effects across groups and no systematic composition changes within the treatment and the control group. We present the results separately for manufacturing, construction and other services, and trade (including hotels and restaurants) because earlier evidence is mostly limited to manufacturing.
(Primary production and electricity, gas and water supply from Fig. 2 are classified under manufacturing. "Trade (including hotels and restaurants)" includes the sale and maintenance of motor vehicles, retail trade, wholesale trade, and hotels and restaurants from Fig. 2 .)
The likelihood of each type of M&A is explained with the Probit models by establishment-level variables.
7 The values of the explanatory variables (Table 1) are taken from t-1. (Additional explanatory variables such as the capital intensity of production could be useful, but they are not available in our case.
8 ) The appendix (Table A1) M&As. Older firms are more likely to be subjects of internal restructurings. 7 In the calculation of standard errors for firm's age and whether it is an exporter or not, we have taken into account the fact that observations are clustered by firms because, otherwise, standard errors for them would be biased downwards. 8 In matching one need not control for all the observable factors at the same time, but it suffices to condition on the propensity score (i.e. the probability of treatment). 9 The earlier results regarding these effects are reported in detail in Lehto and Lehtoranta (2004) and Lehto (2006) .
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The matching results are reported as the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), with employment changes based on the difference-in-differences estimator. The difference-in-differences matching gives reliable results of the effects of M&As on the employment change even when
M&As that occur in time t have an effect on the employment level in t-1. 10 The number of different types of M&As is somewhat smaller with the use of matching models than in Figs. 1-2 because we require that the establishments considered exist during the whole period from t-1 to t+2. In addition, explaining the employment change in t+2 means that we lose three years of data (1989, 2002 and 2003) . This reduces, in particular, the number of cross-border M&As owing to the surge of crossborder M&As that occurred towards the end of our observation period. The number of M&As is also reduced with the use of matching models owing to non-availability of the control variables for some establishments from the registers of SF.
We report three sets of results for ATTs ( Table 2 ). The first set is based on exact matching on years and industries with the nearest-neighbour matching method. 11 The matching on variables other than years and industries is based on propensity scores. These results constitute our preferred estimate because the number of M&As varies a lot between years and industries (Figs. 1-2), and exact matching on years and industries scales down the amount of bias associated with time-variant and industry-specific unobservable factors. When using the nearest-neighbour matching method one treated unit is always matched to five untreated units. The second set is based on propensity score matching with the nearest-neighbour matching method using the region of common support for the 10 Employment is measured as the average number of employees in the establishment over the year (Table 1) . For this reason, we do not expect that M&As have large effects on the employment level at time t. In general, this is the case. The results for the employment level are reported in a working paper. 11 We use the solely linear part of the prediction (Diamond and Sekhon 2005) when conducting exact matching on years and industries because the compression of the probability mass around the value of 0 and 1 could cause problems for matching.
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A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 17 scores. 12 In general, we do not lose observations by imposing the common support condition because the estimation of Probit models before matching typically deletes the outliers that are outside the common support. 13 To check the validity of the matching, covariate balancing is tested.
For all the variables the matching succeeds in making the means of the covariates close to each other for the treated and controls at the standard 5% level (Appendix A2). 14 The third set of the results is based on the kernel method (Epanechenikov kernel). To illustrate the economic significance of the effects, the absolute number of employees in the target companies is reported (Appendix A3). Table 2 16 This is consistent with our hypothesis that in the service industries a domestic purchaser, being located in the same relevant market as the target firm, may have a greater interest than a foreign one to buy another firm to limit competition.
Because the service market is sometimes geographically restricted and because the joint use of assets (including human capital) may encounter geographical limits, we expected that in the service sectors the rationalisation through asset-sharing and the related downsizing of employment would be more typical of domestic M&As than of cross-border M&As. Accordingly, cross-border M&As have a larger negative effect on employment than domestic M&As (with a domestically-owned purchaser) in the manufacturing sector. The negative employment effects of domestic M&As (with a domestically-owned acquirer) are strongest for construction and other services. The effects are smaller for labour-intensive services (trade, hotels and restaurants) than for manufacturing, because in labour-intensive services there are fewer overall opportunities to downsize workforce.
small size of the local labour markets makes even the average effects regionally important. The effects are smaller for non-manufacturing. 16 We have studied the robustness of the results by dropping the financial sector from construction and other services because restructuring in the financial sector covered a large part of domestic M&As in the services in the early 1990s. The basic findings remain the same. In particular, when the financial sector is dropped from construction and other services for domestic M&As (with a domestically-owned acquirer), the results point to a negative employment change of -0.089 (with t-value of -2.85) and -0.107 (with t-value of -2.87), at time t+1 and t+2, respectively. The effect of the financial sector on the results for other types of M&As is even smaller.
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The quantitative magnitude of employment losses from domestic M&As (with a domesticallyowned purchaser) is quite similar to that reported by Gugler and Yurtoglu, according to which M&As in Europe reduce the demand for labour by about 10% on average. For instance, negative employment change is around 9% in an establishment in construction and other services at time t+1.
The results for domestic M&As (with a domestically-owned acquirer) differ somewhat between different matching methods. Employment losses are typically largest when kernel matching is used.
The results of domestic M&As (with a foreign-owned acquirer) are based on a very small number of M&As. There are large negative employment effects in construction and other services, but in trade (hotels and restaurants) the effects are not statistically significant. The results from propensity score matching and kernel matching are similar in this respect. Internal restructurings hurt employment, too. Their effect is strongest in trade (including hotels and restaurants). There are some positive employment effects in construction and other services when exact matching on years and industries is used, but the effects disappear in propensity score matching and kernel matching.
All in all, our results show that it is not solely cross-border M&As that have statistically significant, negative effects on employment.
Conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature by analysing the employment effects of M&As on targets by using matched establishment-level data from Finland over the period [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] . In this paper, we focus not only on cross-border or domestic M&As, but we also analyse the employment effects of several different types of M&As. We classify M&As being either cross-border M&A (in which the purchaser is a foreign company that is located abroad), domestic M&A with a domestically-owned purchaser, domestic M&A with a foreign-owned company that is located in Finland, or internal A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 20 restructuring in which the purchaser is not another company. Hence, "foreign" has a dual meaning:
first, it refers to the distance between the acquirer and the target firm, and second, it specifies the nationality of an acquirer's owners from the target firm's viewpoint. Our data register practically almost all M&As in all sectors.
We discover that cross-border M&As lead to downsizing in manufacturing employment. The effects of cross-border M&As on employment in non-manufacturing are much weaker. The separation of foreign acquirers by home countries would be an interesting topic for further research because it is possible that the employment effects vary according to the distance between the target and acquiring firm. Regarding the policy implications of our results for cross-border M&As, it is important to note that, at least within the EU, capital flows are restricted by competition law only.
Accordingly, the scope for policy actions to preserve domestic manufacturing employment is limited. Domestic M&As with a domestic purchaser, on the other hand, have negative employment effects for all sectors. The effect of domestic M&As with foreign-owned purchasers on employment is remarkably negative in construction and other services. Internal restructurings that do not involve another company also tend to cause employment losses.
To sum up, the most important finding is that almost all changes in ownership lead to employment losses. That cross-border M&As have a negative impact only in manufacturing and that domestic
M&As with foreign-owned purchasers have, however, a substantial negative impact on employment in construction and other services may emerge from the situation in which foreign interference in service industries develops in two stages: first, by establishing a bridgehead through a cross-border M&A, and after this, strengthening the dominance of the market through domestic M&As. The deep-going rationalisation of activities is typical only of the latter stage because deeper knowledge of the market has developed for a foreign player.
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Our reading of the evidence is that the focus of the earlier research primarily on manufacturing (and listed companies) can deliver a seriously distorted picture of the adjustment of employment that takes place in broader industries. In particular, the negative effects of cross-border M&As on employment are almost non-existent in non-manufacturing. Furthermore, the negative effects of M&As on employment do not arise exclusively from cross-border M&As. The evidence therefore points out that cross-border M&As seem to be less specific regarding their effects on employment than has previously been thought. A prominent explanation for employment losses is that the change in control through M&As offers an opportunity for a new management team to renege on implicit labour contracts that have constituted obstacles for layoffs (Shleifer and Summers). Our results call for more studies that incorporate information from non-manufacturing sectors. 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Cross-bo rder Do mestic Internal restructuring
Page 31 Note: Robust z statistics are reported; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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